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Abstract
DNS provides a critical function in directing Internet traffic. Traditional rule-based anomaly or intrusion detection methods
are not able to update the rules dynamically. Data mining based approaches can find various patterns in massive dynamic
query traffic data. In this paper, a novel periodic trend mining method is proposed, as well as a periodic trend pattern based 
traffic prediction method. Clustering is adopted to partition numerous domain names into separate groups by the 
characteristics of their query traffic time series. Experimental results on a real-word DNS log indicate data mining based 
approaches are promising in the domain of DNS service.
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1. Introduction
Domain Name System (DNS) is a hierarchical distributed naming system for computers, services, or any 
resource connected to the Internet. A Domain Name Service resolves queries for URLs into IP addresses for the
purpose of locating computer services and devices worldwide. By providing a worldwide, distributed keyword-
based redirection service, DNS is an essential component of the functionality of the Internet.
With the ever increasing network flow and complexity of network topology, problems often happen in DNS
service. For example, a large-scale network break-down happened in 6 provinces in China in 2009 due to an
attack to the DNS server by a hacker. China has been one of the countries suffering from enormous network 
attacks in the world. Security has become a crucial problem in DNS service. Thus, it is an important task for 
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DNS service providers to detect and report anomalies or exceptions as early as possible, and reduce the loss 
resulted from the unexpected events. Another important task is to provide high quality service to Web users.  
Traditional methods in DNS security are rule-based methods. DNS experts have to identify the 
characteristics or features of any abnormal behavior from historical data offline, and then explicitly provide 
them to the monitoring system in the form of rules. However, such rule-based methods have two serious 
weaknesses: 1) the rules are not easy to update since efforts of domain experts are required. However, the 
patterns of abnormal behaviors in the network are evolving dramatically, and thereby the effectiveness of the 
detection system will be significantly reduced; 2 the size of historical data set collected by DNS system is so 
huge that beyond  the ability of human being to analyze. For example, the number of query records captured by 
DNS log at a top level domain server is over 40 billion in a single month. Automatic quantitative analysis 
techniques on massive DNS data are in real demand. 
Data mining is a kind of technique that can discover interesting, meaningful and understandable patterns 
hidden in massive datasets. The patterns discovered by data mining can be utilized in decision-making in many 
domains. To our best knowledge, data mining has not been widely used in DNS query traffic analysis yet. 
Therefore, in this paper, we explore to solve problems in DNS service by applying various data mining 
methods.  Our contributions are listed as follows  
1) 
 
2) 
 
3) -
 
-
 
2. Related Work 
Since query traffic flow is an accurate reflection of DNS service, anomaly detection in query traffic has been 
paid more and more attention. For example, Jung et al. [1] proposed a novel method to detect anomaly in 
SMTP Client by DNS query traffic. Ishibashi et al. [2] proposed a method to discover junk mail senders by 
studying ISP DNS. But in some circumstance, DNS itself can be part of the attack in Internet like DDoS [3] 
and DNS cache poisoning [4]. 
-
 
Wang et al. [6] proposed a mathematical method to detect nation-wide large-scale attacks on the Internet. A 
covariance matrix is built to record the covariance between the query volumes happened at two different 
provinces at different time stamps. Average covariance matrix indicates a normal situation. If the current 
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covariance matrix deviates from the average covariance significantly, an abnormal event may be going on. This 
method is suitable for nation-wide attacks but fails in the detection of attacks towards a specific domain name. 
Xu et al. [7] improved RIPPER algorithm to detect Botnet, which is often used for malicious activities (e.g., 
DDos, spam, phishing etc.). It outperforms the traditional algorithms, such as features matching or statistical 
methods, in discovering more less-visited domain names.  
3. Query Traffic Trend Prediction and Anomaly Detection 
Anomaly detection in DNS query traffic is significant for DNS service providers. Malfunction of DNS 
server or network may result in abnormal query traffic, as well as abnormal behaviours or illegal behaviours of 
Web users. Thus, DNS query traffic indicates the health of the DNS and the network. As far as our knowledge 
concerns, most existing algorithms [1, 6, 7] are rule-based or black-list based approaches, where the rules are 
not able to be adjusted dynamically.  
In this section, we propose a novel problem, periodic query traffic trend mining, and a method to discover 
all the periodic trend patterns in a sequence database. We assume that if a pattern occurs frequently in the 
recent history, it may occur repeatedly with high probability unless an abnormal event happens. Since patterns 
with time interval tend to be haphazard and unreliable, we are only interested in patterns with no interval. Then 
we predict the traffic volume at the next moment by referring the recent periodically occurred query traffic 
patterns.  
3.1. Problem statement 
Periodic trend mining problem can be stated as follows: 
 I =  {i1, i2 m} is a set of items; 
 T =  {t1, t2 tp} is a set of timing stamps; 
 An event set, E, is a 2-tuple, (ij, tk)  , where item ij  (  happened at tk  (  k p 
 D = {S1, S2 Sn} is a time series database where each time series Si  D consists of a sequence of events 
 An event set E is a periodic trend if sup(E)  min_sup, and the timing stamps in E are consecutive, where 
min_sup is the user pre-specified minimum support threshold; 
 The task of periodic trend mining is to find the complete set of periodic trends, U = {E| sup(E)  min_sup }. 
I = {0, 1, 2}, and T 
hours of a day. Assume the minimum support threshold is 3, then ((0:0), (1:1), (1:2)) is a periodic trend pattern 
because it occurred in three sequences, S2, S3, S4, consecutively 
((1:2), (2:3)) only occurred in sequence S1 and S2, it is not a periodic trend pattern although ((2:2), (1:3)) 
occurred in S28, where the two items, 1 and 2 did not occur in the right order. ((0:0), (1:2), (2:3)) is not a 
periodic pattern because it violates the definition that the timing stamps must be consecutive.  
Table 1.Query traffic variation database of Yahoo.cn 
ID Traffic query traffic variations 24 hours  
S1 (0:0)       (0:1)      (1:2)       (  
S2  
S3  
S4  
  
S28 (0:0)       (1:1)      (2:2)       (  
 
3.2. Periodic trend mining 
If the frequency of an event set, E, beyond a user pre-specified minimum support threshold, we call E a 
periodic trend pattern. Each event is an item with an associated timing stamp. A periodic pattern indicates that 
83 Weizhang Ruan et al. /  Procedia Computer Science  17 ( 2013 )  80 – 87 
the sequence occurs frequently/repeatedly at the same time. Periodic trend mining is to find all the periodic
trends. The periodic trend mining problem follows downward closure property or Apriori property [8], that is, 
if a trend E is not a periodic (frequent) pattern, its superset cannot be periodic (frequent) at all. Thus, we
propose an iterative level-wise approach based on candidate generation.
Figure 1 shows the pseudo code of our proposed periodic trend mining algorithm. U denotes the collection
of all the periodic trend patterns, and events within any p U are in increasing order in time. It follows the 
generation-and-test methodology like Apriori [8]. In the main loop (from line 2 to 9), it generates the k-event-
set candidates and then finds out the real periodic k-event-sets by scanning the database. With the support of 
Downward Closure Property, procedure candidate_gen ( ) generates a k-event-set candidate by joining two
periodic (k-1)-event-sets which share the common (k-2) prefix. Note that the timing points of all the event in 
each event-set must be consecutively increasing.
Fig. 1. Pseudo code of periodic trend mining algorithm.
Input: Time series database D, minimum support threshold, min_sup.
Output: U, periodic trends in D.
1     U1 = find_periodic 1-event-sets (D);
2  for (k = 2; Uk-1 ; k++) {
3 Ck = candidate_gen (Uk-1, min_sup);
4          for each time series S D
5               for each c Ck
6                    if  c S then
7 c.count++;
8 Uk = {c Ck | c.count min_sup}
9     }
10    return U = k Uk;
procedure candidate_gen (Uk-1: periodic (k-1)-event-sets; min_sup: minimum support
threshold)
1     for each event-set p1 Uk-1
2          for each event-set p2 Uk-1
3               if (p1 1] = p2 1]) (p1 2] = p2 2]) (p1 k-2] = p2 k-2])) then {
4 c = p1 p2 in increasing order by time;
5                    if timing points of c[k-1] and c k] are not consecutive then
6                         delete c;
7                    else if has_infrequent_subsets (c, Uk-1) then
8                         delete c;
9  else add c to Ck;
10              }
11     return Ck;
procedure has_infrequent_subsets (c: candidate k-event-sets; Uk-1: periodic (k-1)-
event-sets)
1 for each (k-1)-event-set s of c
2 if s Uk-1 then
3           return TURE;
4  return FALSE;
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3.3. Query traffic trend prediction and anomaly detection 
We predict the traffic volume of a given domain name at the incoming moment by referring the recent 
periodic patterns. The prediction method can be roughly outlined in three steps: 
1) Mine the periodic query traffic trend patterns from the recent query traffic data at a given domain name;  
2) Obtain strong patterns from the periodic trend patterns. Here we adopt the concept, confidence, from 
association rules mining problem [8]. Assuming E=A B is a periodic (frequent) trend, the confidence of E is 
defined as the conditional probability of B given A, that is, confidence(E)= confidence(A B) = P(B|A). If a 
periodic trend pattern E satisfies the minimum confidence threshold, min_conf, we call E a strong trend pattern. 
3) Predict the incoming query traffic by referring the strong patterns. If the actual traffic volume deviates from 
the prediction significantly, an anomaly warning will be delivered to the central monitoring system 
immediately.   
3.4. Experimental results 
We use a real-world DNS log dataset in our experiments. A DNS log record is generated whenever a DNS 
request is issued by a client. For example, when a user browses a domain name by its URL, a DNS log record 
will be created and recorded in the log. Attributes collected by DNS log include requesting time, source IP, 
destination URL, query type, etc. The size of a DNS log is huge. For example, around 40 billion records are 
captured at a top level domain server every month. It is even larger at a root domain server. The DNS log 
dataset we use in our paper is captured by CN Top Level Domain Server in February 2012, containing 40 
billion records.  
An expert at China Internet Network Information Center suggested that an alert of an anomalous variation is 
more useful and valuable to its system, rather than the raw number of visits, therefore, we pre-process the log 
data as follows: 
1)  
2)  
3) 
 
4) 
 
We select relatively popular domain names for our experiment, whose average query frequency per hour is 
over 2000. 676 data sets are created, one set per domain name. Table 1 shows part of the dataset for Yahoo.cn, 
where each row represents the query traffic variations hourly in a day. 
Experiments are performed on all the domain names and numerous strong periodic trend patterns are mined. 
Due to the space limitation, we only present the results from Yahoo.cn as an example. 37 strong periodic trend 
patterns are mined from the query traffic variation database of Yahoo.cn when min_sup and min_conf are set at 
35% and 70%, respectively. Table 2 presents some of the strong periodic trend patterns. From Table 2, we can 
make predictions with high confidence in some cases. For example, if the query traffic has been rising 
continuously for two hours since 21:00pm, the probability the traffic will continue rising from 23:00 to 
24:00pm is 100%. So, if the query traffic volume declines some time between 23:00 to 24:00pm, we have high 
confidence to believe that an anomalous event is happening towards Yahoo.cn. 
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Table 2. Strong periodic trend patterns discovered at Yahoo.cn 
Pattern 
length 
Start 
time 
Periodic Trend Patterns Support Confidence 
3 13 [ 1.  1.  1.]  13/28 If the query traffic at Yahoo.cn has been rising for two 
hours since 13:00pm, the probability the traffic will 
continue rising from 15:00 to 16:00pm is 92.8%. 
3 17 [ 0.  0.  0.] 11/28 If the query traffic has been declining for two hours 
since 17:00pm, the probability the traffic will continue 
declining from 19:00 to 20:00pm is 84.6%. 
3 21 [ 1.  1.  1.]  13/28 If the query traffic has been rising for two hours since 
21:00pm, the probability the traffic will continue rising 
from 23:00 to 24:00pm is 100%. 
17 0 [0.  0.  0.  0.  0.  0.  0.] 11/28 If the query traffic has been declining for three hours 
since 00:00am, the probability the traffic will continue 
declining from 3:00 to 7:00am is 73.3%. 
     
 
4. Clustering-based Query Traffic Characteristic Analysis 
The number of Domain names on the Internet is so enormous that beyond the ability of human being to 
analyse their query traffic characteristics one by one. Thus, it is necessary to partition the domain names into 
groups where domain names with similar query traffic are in the same group, and domain names with 
dissimilar characteristics are in other groups. Experts can thereby perform analysis in each group, such as 
extracting the common characteristics of the Web users, or identifying the common characteristics of 
anomalous behaviors, which is useful for DNS service providers to prevent attacks, and valuable for National 
Security Bureau. 
4.1. Shared-Nearest-Neighbour clustering 
Clustering is one of the most widely used data mining techniques. It partitions the data into clusters so that 
objects within a cluster have high similarity in comparison to one another but are dissimilar to objects in other 
clusters. Dissimilarities are assessed based on the attribute/dimension values describing the objects. Distance is 
often used as the similarity measure. K-means is the most popular clustering algorithm with no doubt. K-means 
clustering based has been studied in DNS Query traffic in [5]. Although it produces interesting results, it needs 
prior knowledge of the number of clusters, k, which is not easily obtained beforehand. Another serious 
weakness of K-means is that it is not suitable for high dimensional data. 
In this paper, we are interested in finding out the characteristics of query traffic time series at different 
domain names, which is high in dimensionality in nature. Therefore, we adopt a more recent clustering 
algorithm, Share-Nearest-Neighbor clustering (SNN). In SNN, similarity of two objects is measured by the 
number of neighbors that two objects share. Density of an object is defined as the sum of the similarities of an 
object . SNN eliminates noise (low density objects) and builds clusters by associating non-
noise objects with representative or core objects (high density objects). The neighbor-based similarity measure 
allows SNN to find clusters for high dimensional objects, and the use of core/representative objects allows 
SNN to find arbitrarily shaped clusters. In addition, SNN automatically determines the number of clusters. 
Experimental results on high dimensional time series data have been reported [9]. 
4.2. Data pre-processing 
We use the DNS log captured by CN Top Level Domain Server in February 2012 in our experiment. The 
temporal nature of DNS query traffic series poses a number of challenges. For instance, DNS query traffic 
series is noisy; such data displays temporal autocorrelation, i.e., traffic volume close in time tend to be highly 
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 (hourly cycles) and temporal autocorrelation, we 
pre-processed the data to remove seasonality by hourly Z-score transformation. The Z-score transformation 
also reduces temporal autocorrelation significantly. Since the time series spanning 28 days (24 numbers each 
year), we also detrended the data before our analysis. Our data pre-processing method can be outlined as 
follows: 
1)   Find all the distinct domain names occurred in the log; 
2)   Count the number of visits to each domain name by hour by day; 
3)   Select the most popular 676 domain names whose average number of visits per hour beyond 2000; 
4)   Use hourly Z-score transformation, which takes the set of numbers for a given hour, calculates the mean 
and standard deviation of that set of number  data by subtracting of the 
corresponding hourly mean and then dividing by the hourly standard deviation; 
5)   Detrend the query traffic time series for each domain name. 
Eventually, we obtained a table consisting of 676 rows (domain names) and 672 columns (28 days x 24 
hours), where each number denotes the transformed number of visits to a given domain name in a given hour. 
4.3. Experimental results 
We implement SNN exactly the same as in [9]. Here the link strength threshold for representative object and 
noise are set at 3800 and 200, and the strong link threshold is set at 10. Seven clusters are discovered and the 
corresponding clustering representatives are presented in Figure 2, from 2(a) to 2(g), where each curve reflects 
the hourly query traffic volume. 50 out of 676 domain names are discarded as noise. In Figure 2, we can see 
that the difference between the query traffic trends of different clusters is evident, indicating that the behaviors 
of the users visiting the domain names in different clusters have quite different characteristics, especially 
cluster 7 in Figure 2(g). Although our current clustering result is preliminary, it is promising to segment 
abnormal temporal behaviors from others by SNN clustering, and thereby extract the characteristics of 
anomalous DNS queries. 
5. Conclusion & Future Work 
In this paper, we focused on discovering useful patterns from the DNS query traffic data to assist DNS 
service providers to detect anomalies and get to learn the behavior patterns of the Web users of different 
domain names. Since DNS log data is enormous in size and evolving fast, data mining approaches which can 
discover patterns dynamically are adopted in this work. Firstly, we proposed a novel problem, periodic trend 
mining, and then a prediction method is proposed to predict the incoming traffic volume and detect anomaly. 
Secondly, we partitioned the query traffic time series data into separate clusters by using SNN clustering 
algorithm, and thereby further insights of each cluster are studied. The effectiveness of our methods has been 
demonstrated by the experimental results on a real-world DNS query traffic log dataset. Interesting patterns are 
observed which are useful for the DNS service providers and the National Security Bureau. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5)   Explore methods to mine query traffic patterns under the influence of unexpected incidents. 
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Figure 2. Cluster representatives of DNS query traffic data.
